

SOF Profession of Arms: A SOF Unique Requirement for Special Forces Officers Attending Intermediate Level Education

**A Monograph
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
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
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
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Abstract

Are there SOF unique educational requirements for Special Forces (SF) Officers attending Intermediate Level Education (ILE) at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) by LTC James M Tennant, U.S. Army, 59 pages.

The purpose of this research was to identify the SOF unique educational requirements for SF Officers attending CGSC's ILE. This question came to the forefront at the Command and General Staff College when the United States Army Special Operations Command requested JPME I credit for Officers attending the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey CA. The purpose was to find additional opportunities to develop the SF major in order to meet the changing global environment the SF officer would operate in. The colleges' concern was that the SF Officer would not receive the proper professional development required to prepare them for the remainder of their professional career. The heart of the issue was the professional development of the SF Officer.

The method used to address the research question looked at professions; by analyzing professions and identifying common denominators one could determine the essential pillars of a profession and then apply those pillars to the profession of arms. The pillars identified were a body of knowledge, corporateness/socialization, and service to a greater good. The next step was to look at history to find when these pillars came together to form the army's profession of arms. History also indicated that the profession of arms evolved over time.

The project identified the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) as the most recent evolution in the profession of arms. The legislation reformed the Department of Defense (DoD) and in the process created the United States Special Operations Command (USSCOM) and its many enablers. These enablers provided USSOCOM with something no other Combatant command had: service like responsibilities. The project identified not only the evolution of a Joint Profession of Arms but also, with the creation of USSOCOM, a SOF Profession of Arms.

The project looked at the SF Officer to see the role the pillars played in the SF Officers professional development. It became apparent that the pillars of the SOF profession of arms did not prepare them for their entire career but rather for their initial SF assignment.

The project concluded that there are SOF unique requirements for SF Officers attending ILE at CGSC. Those requirements are to foster a SOF profession of arms by taking a holistic approach to professional development of the SF officer in the SOF profession of arms. By approaching the subject in a holistic manner, ILE becomes an adaptive professional development experience evolving and adapting over time.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.....	5
The Profession of Arms: Is It Really?.....	8
The Convergence of the Professional Pillars in the U.S. Army Profession of Arms:.....	14
The Evolution of a Joint Profession of Arms.....	26
SOF Profession of Arms and the Special Forces Officer.....	41
Conclusion	51
Bibliography	54

Introduction

As the Special Operations Forces (SOF) Education, (Ed) Director for the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) the author received questions regarding the SOF unique requirements of Special Forces (SF) Officers attending the CGSC's Command and General Staff School (CGSS), also known as Intermediate Level Education (ILE). This was a direct result of a request submitted by the Commanding General United State Army Special Operation Command (USASOC) to the G-3 of the Army requesting permission to grant Joint Professional Military Education Credit phase 1 for Army Officers attending the Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) in Monterey California. Senior CGSC staff and faculty members worried that Special Forces (SF) Officers would elect the 18-month Special Operations masters degree program sponsored by the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) over the ILE program at Fort Leavenworth if the Army G-3 granted USASOC's request. There were a number of concerns with the secondary and tertiary impacts on the Army and the SOF community if approved but the greatest challenge was perceptions management. The most contentious misperception revolved around the SF Proponent withdrawing from CGSC's ILE program to attend the SOF program at NPS. This misperception raised a concern that ILE seminars would not have SF Officer participation; this therefore spawned the question, what are the SOF unique educational requirements for SF Officers?

This was the catalyst for a certain level of healthy friction and discourse between the Training and Doctrine Command's Combined Arms Center senior leaders and the senior leaders from USASOC. The underlying theme continually presented by the senior leaders in the college was identifying the SOF Unique requirements for Special Forces Officers attending ILE. The ultimate goal of the college was to have enough SF officers to have one SF student per seminar. The author witnessed concerns of the senior leaders of the college that if they supported USASOC's request the college would lose the JPME leverage. The question seemed fair and legitimate but indicated to the author that there was a need for more clarity in order to answer the question. The ultimate goal of all parties involved was to work

towards providing the best professional development opportunity for SF Officers at CGSC's ILE program to prepare them for the rest of their professional career.

This research project focused solely on SOF unique professional military education requirements for SF Officers attending intermediate level PME in order to identify and provide that 'simple' answer to the question that had arisen with USASOC's aforementioned request. The research question, "Should there be SOF unique professional military education requirements for SF Officers attending Intermediate Level Professional Military Education (PME) and if so what should they be?" This research question was built on a false premise that a SOF educational Rosetta Stone existed and, if found, would prepare the SF Officer to function as a field grade officer for the remainder of his career. The research quickly indicated that the right question was the broader question of should there be SOF unique requirements for SF Officers attending ILE and if so what should they be? This expanded the scope of the project from identifying the educational competency requirements, thus answering the 'question' in a more holistic manner to preparing SF Officers in ILE.

Competency modeling and mapping (CMM) is a popular and alluring approach to education based on a false premise. Systems analysis was the basis for CMM, which was a very effective tool during the industrial era. Its genesis was Fredrick Taylor's scientific management theory implemented by Henry Ford to create a work force centered on the standardization of tasks for his assembly lines. There are many types of CMM but they generally take on a formal, top-down effort to identify, list, label, track, and measure competency descriptors. The linkage from the competencies to training and educational objectives and events generates the concept of mapping. On the surface they tend to be very comprehensive due to voluminous charts depicting the linkages, tracking mechanisms, and promise of integration horizontally and vertically with the operational organizations and educational institutions. The problem with the CMM approach was that it is a single-looped system approach derived from Taylorism and Fordism and is counterintuitive to develop critical thinkers, especially SF Officers. The question lent itself to approaching the problem via a CMM methodology which explained why the initial question was so difficult to answer.

The single-loop learning system of CMM is a self-perpetuating process that can provide a false sense of clarity to the complex and ambiguous environment the SF officer operates in. The challenge that comes with CMM is that it is hierarchically driven and bureaucratic in nature. The caution when using CMM, its Achilles heel, that it does not have the ability to identify an adequate list, not even a complete list, of competencies applicable to a rapidly changing operational environment.¹ This was exactly the frustration the author had as the SOF Ed Director. The trap of following the single-loop learning of CMM “reflects the ways in which improving capabilities with one rule, technology, strategy, or practice interferes with changing that rule technology, strategy, of practice to another that is potentially superior.”² The limitation of CMM forced the author to take a holistic approach toward SOF unique requirements for SF Officers attending ILE and what they should be.

The holistic approach looks beyond PME, to avoid falling into the self-limiting CMM trap, and instead focuses on professions. The author studied professions to establish common pillars and then confirm that the profession of arms possessed those pillars. Professional and profession are not synonymous; one can be professional and not be part of a profession. As the paper will point out, three pillars common to all professions include a Body of Knowledge, a Socialization/Corporateness Process, and Service to a Greater Good. Using these pillars as the next task, the monograph will identify when those pillars came together in the United States Army to form the profession of arms. This highlighted the importance of taking the holistic approach to illustrate that the profession of arms was an evolutionary process.

History allows for a study of the evolution of the profession of arms. The failed hostage rescue, Operation Eagle Claw, of Americans held by Iranian Islamists and the subsequent Holloway Commission report served as a catalyst for reform of the Department of Defense (DoD) through the Goldwater Nichols

¹ George Reed, Craig Bullis, Ruth Collins, and Christopher Paparone. "Mapping the Route of Leadership Education: Caution Ahead." *Parameters*, 2004: 46-60

² March, James G. *A Primer on Decision Making, How Decisions Happen*. (New York: The Free Press, 1994.), 96-97

Act (GNA). Those events were significant because they drove the Nation, through Congress, to reform the DoD. Although Eagle Claw failed operationally, it had second and third order strategic benefits in subsequent years. The paper looks at the most recent evolution of the profession of arms toward the creation of a 'Joint Profession of Arms' with the implementation of the GNA and the United States Special Operations Command through the Nunn/Cohen Amendment to the GNA. The research project looked at the genesis of USSOCOM and how the legislation formed both the Command and created a Joint Profession of Arms through Joint Officer Development (Body of Knowledge) and Joint Officer Management (Socialization) which has become a driving factor in today's military. The creation of a Joint Profession of Arms serves as a precedent for the SOF Profession of Arms, and arguably that the creation of USSOCOM was a prototype for a Joint Profession.

The final section of this project focuses on the Special Forces Officer, as the largest, contingent of the SOF profession of arms officers within USSOCOM. The research project applied the pillars of the profession of arms against Special Forces Officers to see if they existed within Special Forces. Once the pillars were applied, it became apparent that there are SOF unique requirements for SF Officers attending ILE. Those requirements are to recognize that a SOF Profession of Arms exists and to develop the pillars of that SOF profession for SF Officers attending ILE. By focusing on the SOF profession of arms versus a competency model, the trap of single loop learning is avoided and a collaborative developmental framework grows which fosters the SOF profession of arms.

The Profession of Arms: Is It Really?

"The Military professional lives in a world where there is virtually no place to hide. They constantly are evaluated by colleagues and superiors. These interrelationships between human beings and the institution as a whole give rise to a number of political relationships. The highly competitive nature of the profession opens a number of channels by which one can achieve career success, which rests on informal and unofficial relationships. Understanding the professional military world, therefore, requires a study of these major themes: the similarity of civilian and military professions; the underlying uniqueness of the military profession; and the humanistic quality of the profession."³

³Sam C.Sarkesian, *The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975.

Often people use the term profession without a full understanding of its definition. “When the term professional has been used in connection with the military, it normally has been in the sense of ‘professional’ as contrasted to ‘amateur’ rather than in the sense of ‘profession’ as contrasted with ‘trade’ or ‘craft’. The phrase ‘professional army’ and ‘professional soldier’ have obscured the difference between the career enlisted man, who is in the sense one who works for monetary gain, and the career officer who is professional in the very sense of one who pursues a ‘higher calling’ in the service of society.”⁴ The profession of arms will be examined through the lens of the Officer Corps and not the army as a whole. Studying the definition and explanations of what a profession is from established and accepted professions will bring an understanding that the profession of arms is in fact a profession

In looking at professions, the logical first step is to look at what political scientists have to say on the subject of professions. One of the most famous political scientists to write about the military was Samuel Huntington. Huntington discussed two types of civil control of the military, what he labeled subjective civilian control and objective civilian control. In the end, he argued for objective civilian control; the only way to accomplish objective civilian control is through military professionalism. Before coming to that conclusion, Huntington in his book, *The Soldier and the State*, described the concept of a Profession as follows, “The distinguishing characteristics of a profession as a special type of vocation are its Expertise, Responsibility, and Corporateness.”⁵

Huntington described *Expertise* as institutions of *research and education* that are required for the extension and transmission of professional knowledge and skill. Contact exists between the academic and practical sides of a profession through journals, conferences, and the circulation of personnel between practice and teaching.⁶ Huntington makes a critical link between application and the body of knowledge required in professions. It is not enough to have the professional knowledge but it is critical that one

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, (Cambridge MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 8

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

takes that professional knowledge and transmits it back to the entire profession. In essence, the expertise developed over time becomes part of the collective body of knowledge of the profession.

Huntington also described *Responsibility* as; “The professional man is a practicing expert, working in a social context, and performing a service, such as the promotion of, education, or justice, which is essential to the functioning of society. The client of every profession is society, individually or collectively.”⁷ Huntington establishes that the expertise possessed by individuals in a profession is in support of a greater societal good; members of professions have a responsibility to a functional society. They serve a greater good.

Huntington finally described *Corporateness* as; “The members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen. This collective sense has its origins in the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional competence, common bond of work, and the sharing of a unique social responsibility.”⁸ Huntington took the expertise and social responsibility to a fraternal collective, which separates it from those non-members of the collective. Huntington, therefore, touched on the importance of socialization and the individual’s submission to the authority of that profession; they give up their individuality to become part of the group accepting its values, standards, and norms.

As Huntington leaned toward socialization as a critical component of a profession, it makes logical sense to see how sociologists describe professions. Sociologist William J Goode, the 63rd President of the American Sociological Association, in 1960 wrote about professions in the context of the social worker. Looking to Goode for insights into what makes a profession brings an aspect totally disassociated with the profession of arms. Goode suggested that when examining occupations one should look at them as “falling on a continuum of Professionalism”.⁹ One can deduct from the statement that all

⁷ Ibid., 9

⁸ Ibid., 10

⁹ Goode, William J. ““Encroachment, Charlatanism, and the Emerging Profession: Psychology, Sociology, and Medicine,”.”(*American Sociological Review XXV*, December 1960), 903

occupations are professions but that some are more professional than others. Goode explained the essential elements of a profession, listing two critical elements of a profession as having a prolonged specialized training in a body of abstract knowledge, and a collectivity or service orientation. Goode's position was that the more professional an occupation become the more it-developed traits sociologically derived from "the body of knowledge and a collectivity or service orientation". Goode listed 10 traits identified with professions.¹⁰

The profession determines its own standards of body of knowledge development demanding its member go through a more in-depth socialization process and experiences. This preparation is important because a licenser recognizes the profession, which is overseen by members of that profession. The profession is usually self-regulating which requires a higher caliber student because of the power and prestige of the profession. The profession is generally free of lay evaluation and control with the onus on its members to enforce the established norms of the profession, which tend to be more stringent than legal controls. The members identify and affiliate more with the profession and for all practical purposes, the profession is more likely to be a terminal occupation.¹¹

If one accepts Goode's premise that all occupations are professions by varying degrees along his aforementioned continuum, then there is little doubt that the profession of arms is a profession. The profession of arms has professional military education beginning at the pre-commissioning level and running through the general officer ranks. This continual education is part of the socialization process that builds upon the shared experiences of the officers. The profession of arms is a self-regulating body made up of its own members, which constantly monitors the profession in all aspects from cradle to grave. The profession of arms is the quintessential profession if one applies Goode's traits. The common thread that binds the Political Scientist and the Sociologist are education and self-governance. Goode's traits do not emphasize the service orientation as much as it emphasizes collective self-regulation.

¹⁰ Ibid., 903

¹¹ Ibid.

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Dr. Alan Klass, MD¹² wrote an article for the Canadian Medical Association Journal addressing the topic of what is a profession. Dr. Klass gave a legal definition for profession: "A profession is a self-selected, self-disciplined group of individuals who hold themselves out to the public as possessing a special skill derived from education and training and who are prepared to exercise that skill primarily in the interests of others."¹³ Dr. Klass posited that: "In this brief account of the origin of the professions, the basic, indeed essential element is established, namely conception and birth within a university. A profession inherits the ideas and ideals of a university: scholarship and research with the single aim of excellence. Without this idealism born in a university, a profession cannot begin to exist."¹⁴ As with Huntington and Goode, Klass sees the first critical component of a profession as education and the development of a body of knowledge that the profession maintains. Dr Klass obviously felt that the university was the principal qualifying element of a profession; however, he did not identify it as the sole element. He expanded his view to include two other critical elements of a profession: legal status and spirit.

Dr Klass discussed in detail that a profession must have a legal status. It must acquire a statutory basis in the law of the country. In effect, the law creates a mutual exchange of definable values between the state and the professional group. For the profession to exist as a recognizable group, it is mandatory that the public grant to the professional body, by legislative statute, more or less tangible monopolies, along with self-governing privileges. By statute a professional group has the exclusive right of

¹² Dr Klass (1907-2000) was an established Canadian surgeon who held many positions at the University of Manitoba and served as the President of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Manitoba. His life experiences and professional track were unique, serving as an apprentice to doctor in eastern Europe, prior to medical school, giving him insights in to the medical profession that not many of his peers had.

¹³ Alan A. Klass, M.D., "What is a profession?" *Canadian Medical Association Journal*, no 85 (Sep 1961): 698

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 699

Klass places a special emphasis on the legal status given to a profession for self-governance in support of the greater society.

The final element of Dr. Klass's definition of a profession is that it must have professional spirit. The conscience of members of a profession is their own personal and private sense of dedication to society; this is what makes a profession great. This professional spirit, or Corporateness in the Huntington model, "is the result of the association of men and women of superior type with a common ideal of service above gain, excellence above quality, self-expression beyond pecuniary motive and loyalty to a professional code above individual advantage."¹⁶ Dr. Klass' comments on the professional spirit capture the importance of the socialization process and the importance of the collective of individuals to work toward a better societal good.

Dr. Klass concluded his article by summing up his view of what a profession is and this conclusion applies to the profession of arms. "The development of professional responsibility had its birth in the university, was granted corporate form by the law of the land, and was given the breath of life by the aspiration toward excellence. A strong professional organization may become an important influence in the protection of freedom of the individual both within and without the profession. A profession can provide a durable bridge between conflicting ideologies."¹⁷

Jon A. Schmidt, Professional Engineer (PE), Structural Engineering Certification Board (SECB) in an article to *Structure Magazine*, questioned whether structural engineering was a profession. The difference between Dr Klass and Jon Schmidts' motives for writing their articles was that Klass was trying to protect the idea of a profession where as Schmidt tried to validate that his career field met accepted criteria to call his vocation a profession. Schmidt turned toward three famous people in the fields of medicine, (Abraham Flexner, famous for the creation of Americas Modern Medical School), academia (Sociologist Ernest Greenwood, Professor Emeritus UC Berkley), and law (Lawyer Michael

¹⁶ Ibid., 700

¹⁷ Ibid., 701

neutral instrument of the State is critical to Huntington's objective civilian control. Todor D. Tagarev²¹ wrote an article titled, "The Role of Military Education in Harmonizing Civil Military Relations (The Bulgarian Case Study)"; in it, he concisely captures Samuel Huntington's argument that the modern officer corps is a profession possessing the three characteristics of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Tagarev writes; "The distinctive sphere of competency, characteristic for all officers independent on service or branch, is their monopoly on the use and management of violence. The responsibility is in guaranteeing the military security of the state. The corporate character of the officership is formed by complex procedures and requirements for access to the profession, an explicit system for promotion and appointments, the system of military education, a clear-cut hierarchy and staff organization, and the esprit and competence of the officer corps. A corporate structure of regulations, norms, customs, and traditions guides the behavior of the officer within the military structure. The professional behavior towards society is based on the understanding that his expertise may be applied only for purposes, approved by society through its political agent, the state."²² Tagarev so eloquently summarizes Samuel Huntington, which leads to the logical question of when the journey began for the profession of arms in the United States army officer corps.

Addressing this question, William B. Skelton wrote *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861* examining the evolution of the profession of arms in the U.S. Army's officer corps. He posits that the evolution occurred during the period between the Revolution and the Civil War. Skelton states, "Although tiny by twentieth-century standards, the officer corps of the United States eventually acquired a regular system of recruitment and professional education, a well-defined area of responsibility, a considerable degree of continuity in its membership, and permanent institutions to

²¹ Todd Tagarev is the Director of Programs at Centre for National Security. He wrote "*The Role of Military Education in Harmonizing Civil Military Relations (The Bulgarian Case Study)*" as part of a Fellowship Agreement with the NATO Democratic Institutions and the Bulgarian Academy of Science. This summation brings together the elements of a profession in relationship to the management of violence and its responsibility to serve the state. It lends itself to the subsequent question because just having a military does not mean you have a profession of arms as was the case in his case study.

²² Ibid,9

Bayles). Each of these people wrote about professions from the perspectives of their fields. Jon Schmidt ties them all together in his conclusion to support his assertion that engineering meets the requirements of a profession. Abraham Flexner focused on the body of knowledge, which synthesized experience and educations. Greenwood focused on socialization and the corporate aspects of professions. Michael Bayles thoughts were on the professions service to society.¹⁸ Jon Schmidt concluded from his research that his career field is a profession based on the criteria of Felxner, Greenwood, and Bayles. It possesses a body of knowledge passed through education, has a self-regulating corporate nature, and finally serves the greater societal good. Throughout Schmidt's article education (the body of knowledge), responsibility and authority (corporateness), and finally socialization for a greater service to society are also consistent in the profession of arms.

The Convergence of the Professional Pillars in the U.S. Army Profession of Arms:

As derived from the previous theories, the vocation of officership meets the principal criteria of professionalism. No vocation, not even medicine or law, has all the characteristics of the ideal professional type. Officership is strongest and most effective when it most closely approaches the professional ideal; it is weakest and most defective when it falls short of that ideal.¹⁹ There is little doubt after research that the Army officer corps is a profession developed along this strong ideal. Three common themes that are consistent and required throughout the discussion of professions are education or a body of knowledge, service to a greater good, and a socialization process (E Pluribus Unum).²⁰ These themes will serve as the essential elements of a profession throughout this paper.

Huntington's theories on successful civil military relations are rooted in the military professionalism. A corps of officers forged in the fire of professionalism and committed to serve as a

¹⁸ Jon A. Schmidt, "What is a profession?" *Structure Magazine*, November 2008: 9 under "Settings", <http://www.structuremag.org/article.aspx?articleID=788> (accessed April 13, 2009)

¹⁹ Wakin 1979, 15

²⁰ This Latin phrase was the Nations motto meaning 'From many one', which is the essence of corporateness.

maintain internal cohesion and military expertise.”²³ Skelton goes on to point out that, “The structure of the United States Army in the thirty years after the Revolution reflected the suspicions of centralized power and the institutional experimentation that characterized American life generally during the early national period.”²⁴ The US Army profession of arms evolved into a true profession during the nation’s formative years very much like the nation it served.

The early American aversion to a regular army stemmed from the American Society’s mistrust of the Army serving as an instrument of oppression for whomever controlled it, as experienced by many of the colonists under British rule. Huntington points out that subjective civilian control (SCC) historically manifests itself with the maximization of power of particular governmental institutions, particular social classes or particular constitutional forms. Consequently, SCC involves the power relations among civilian groups. The group will use the military as a means to enhance its power at the expense of other civilian groups advances SCC.²⁵ The citizenry preferred militias, consisting of citizen soldiers, because of their temporary nature and their connection and subservience to the citizenry. The militia approach presented a completely new set of challenges to the profession of arms as Skelton writes; “The Continental Army was a temporary institution and its disbandment left no lasting pattern of officer recruitment. The states controlled most military appointments during the Revolution, and this procedure continued when Congress established the first force of regular troops in 1784.”²⁶ Although the militia system pleased the citizenry, it made it difficult to develop an Army with a social conscience that would serve the greater societal good of that same citizenry. “In the broadest terms, the professional soldier can

²³ Willam B. Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861*. (Lawrence : University Press of Kansas, 1992), xiii .

²⁴ Ibid., 3

²⁵ Samuael P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 80-81

²⁶ Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861*, 13

be defined as a person who has made the military establishment the locus of his career.”²⁷ This is difficult to do when the army is viewed as a temporary organization for times of war.

Skelton captured the challenges that faced the establishment of a profession of arms when he wrote about the first 30 years after the revolution; he used the word instability to describe the army officer corps. He referred to the corps as a group of individuals that possessed little sense of socialization but rather looked on their military careers as an interruption of their civilian lives. Skelton is quick to point out that it is much better to view the officer corps early in the nation’s history as a succession of corps based on time periods very distinct from each other. Skelton highlights the need for the body of knowledge and corporateness to develop a viable and cohesive military establishment before 1815.²⁸ Skelton discussed this period in detail in America’s early history. It is worth examining, to therefore identify when the three essential elements, a body of knowledge, corporateness/socialization(E Pluribus Unum) and service to greater good came together to form the American profession of arms.

Institutions of research and education are required for the extension and transmission of professional knowledge and skill. Contact is maintained between the academic and practical sides of a profession through journals, conferences, and the circulation of personnel between practices and teaching.²⁹ On the job training (OJT) was the method by which early American officers learned their profession, until the establishment of the United States Military Academy (USMA) in 1802. During this same period, the same OJT approach was observed with the legal and medical profession, which relied on apprenticeship under a practicing professional. The ability for the body of knowledge to expand and grow was extremely limited between the apprentice and his master until the establishment of universities in the nation to serve as keepers of the body of knowledge. “With the exception of the small minority who entered as cadets, fledgling army officers moved directly from civil life into the commissioned ranks.

²⁷ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), 54

²⁸ Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861*, 34

²⁹ Wakin 1979, 13

Thus, they obtained their professional skills and modes of behavior haphazardly, by reading military manuals and following the examples of their peers and superiors. Although officers used a variety of manuals before 1815, the most significant by far was Baron von Steuben's *Regulation for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States*, usually called the *Blue Book* or the *Barron* and *The Rules and Articles of War*. Written during the Revolution, Steuben's small volume remained for decades the army's standard guide for both infantry tactics and basic military administration."³⁰

In the absence of a professional military school, the profession had to rely on organizational leaders as the developers and keepers of the body of knowledge; this proved an unreliable method at best. The Legion of the United States created in December of 1792 and commanded by General Anthony Wayne was one success story in which is seen the creation of an organizational body of knowledge transforming the army. The defeat of General Josiah Harmer in October of 1790 at the hands of the Indians in the Ohio Territory and of General Arthur St Clair's force in November 1791 was a wakeup call to Congress and the young nation. Regulars attributed the failures to the indiscipline of the militia and the short-term levies raised in 1791 and to the inadequacy of the supply system, and they began to doubt their own competence.³¹ St Clair's failed to establish camp defenses and provided an inadequate guard force to provide security were examples of lack of discipline the regulars referred to. These failures, although tragic, forced the nation to take the first steps in recognizing the need for a professional army.

Wayne turned out to be among the most brilliant appointments in the Federalist era.³² It was critical for the young nation to recover from the defeats at the hands of the Indians. "With some reluctance, they selected Anthony Wayne, the son of a prosperous farmer and a local leader of southern Pennsylvania. President George Washington and Secretary of War Knox knew him to be an aggressive

³⁰ Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861*, 38

³¹ *Ibid.*, 90

³² Richard H. Kohn, *Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802*. (New York: Free Press, 1975), 124-126

commander and strict disciplinarian—important qualities in light of the army’s recent failures.”³³ Wayne captured the essence of creating and sharing the profession’s body of knowledge. He relied on Von Steuben’s *Blue book* along with books written by British officers who fought in the American frontier. Wayne used his collective experiences to create a disciplined Legion³⁴ trained and rehearsed as a combined arms team. “The goal was to blend the various arms into a self-sustaining field army capable of conducting an arduous wilderness campaign. By demanding constant attention to appearance, by encouraging emulation among the units and by referring proudly in orders to the American Legion, Wayne tried to build morale and esprit de corps.”³⁵ Wayne dispelled the legacy of defeat with a triumph at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794. This was the first appearance in the regular army of an attempt to rely on the body of knowledge to build an organization that embodied the essence of a professional force, though it did not take root. In the end, Wayne’s exertions were overwhelmed by the conditions of life in the early army. His goal was to instill the qualities of the Continental Army at its most effective stage, its discipline, spirit, and tactical proficiency. His idea of military leadership did not extend much further than the practical skills and basic standard of conduct prescribed in the Baron and the Articles of War. He did not develop systematic procedures for the education or professional socialization of junior officers, relying as before on the informal pressures of garrison society. In other words, he failed to institutionalize the standards that he tried to establish.³⁶ When General Wayne died in 1796 many of his initiatives faded.

³³ Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861*, 90 (W. B. Skelton 1992, 90) MG Wayne was a Revolutionary War veteran who had a reputation for being a disciplinarian. His well read man who studied the writing of British Officer who had fought on the frontier. General Wayne also studied the Roman legions and their modern application. He essentially created America’s first combined arms unit. He died shortly after in 1796 so many of the reforms died with him.

³⁴ For more information concerning the history of the American Legions reference *The Origins of the Legion of the United States* by Andrew J Brittle published in *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Oct., 2003), pp. 1249-1261. The article provides a detailed description of the Legions and its history.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 91-92

³⁶ *Ibid.*

Unlike the European powers of the time, America did not have a military education system. Many had tried to build small schools to teach engineering and artillery, however, there was no permanent institution that could capture the experiences of the profession. The Jefferson administration formed a corps of engineers along with an effort to formalize military education. The act reducing the army in March of 1802 was the same act that created the USMA; the thought was to have a cadre force that could expand during times of war and the USMA was a key component of that strategy. Finally, the army acquired, in the words of Dr Klass, “the basic, indeed essential element is established, namely conception and birth within a university. A profession inherits the ideas and ideals of a university: scholarship and research with the single aim of excellence. Without this idealism born in a university, a profession cannot begin to exist.”³⁷ The model for the USMA was the French system of military education, the Ecole Polytechnique. Instruction focused on mathematics, natural philosophy, engineering, and other subjects closely related to the construction and defense of permanent fortification.³⁸ The establishment of West Point in 1802 served as the university and keeper of the body of knowledge for the fledgling profession of arms.

The professional man is a practicing expert, working in a social context, and performing a service, such as the promotion of, education, or justice, which is essential to the functioning of society. The client of every profession is society, individually or collectively.³⁹ One could argue that the creation of the Legion of the United States was the first regular army that showed the responsibility of working in a social context. The failures of fighting the Indians in the Ohio Frontier motivated the nation to look hard at establishing a regular standing army. However, it was not until the country faced another challenge with the Chesapeake affair in 1807 and the threat of war with Britain that the nation again

³⁷ Klass, What is a profession?, 699

³⁸ Skelton, An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861, 102

³⁹ Wakin, War, Morality, and the Military Profession, 14

addressed the issue of a standing army. Skelton captures the internal debate going on within the nation at the time:

“Had they known of the internal character of the officer corps—its heterogeneity, organizational instability, and high rate of attrition—most citizens would not have demanded reformation. During the early national period, military affairs were exceptionally controversial, more volatile perhaps than at any time in American History. Concerned about the survival of an agrarian republic in a world dominated by great powers and apprehensive lest internal divisions undo the accomplishments of the Revolution and the Constitution, these men hoped to expand and improve the peace time Army. A strong regular force would enhance American security, establish and maintain national borders, and become one of a core national institution that would be able to resist the centrifugal forces endangering the American experiment.”⁴⁰

The Army thus had a serious strategic communications problem with the population. The young U.S. Government needed to convince a population, scarred by standing armies, to accept the concept that a standing army served the greater societal good. The fear of conflict convinced the nation that they had a dire need for the development of a regular army focused toward the greater societal good.

Skelton identifies a growing realization that if this new agrarian society was to succeed it would need to have a regular army. “A third and far more ambitious attempt at military reform occurred during the Quasi-war with France. Although Congress expanded the army in 1798 mainly as a response to foreign crisis, High Federalist leaders hoped that the increase would be permanent and that a fully fledged standing army would emerge, capable of defending American interests on the international stage and counteracting internal dissent.”⁴¹ Major General Hamilton, General Washington’s Inspector General during this period, realized the need for a permanent “European-Style” army. His efforts in 1798-1800 to establish the military as an institution through standards, regulation, staff organizations and educational reforms were unsuccessful. If successful, Hamilton reforms would have converted the officer corps from a disorganized collection of individuals into a cohesive and professionally trained cadre of regulars. The ideas proved too ambitious, however, for either the political climate or the realities of military

⁴⁰ Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861*, 87

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 95-96

management at the end of the eighteenth century. On 14 May 1800, Congress abolished the additional army, including Hamilton's office of inspector general, ending Federalists hopes of building a European-style standing Army.⁴²

The nation eventually accepted a regular army because of the War of 1812. "Through the war, the regulars had complained of the expense, inefficiency, and indiscipline of citizen-soldiers, blaming the militia for the military failure. In an 1813 report on militia reform, Gaines had expressed the emerging consensus: Obedience—implicit obedience must be learned before men can be said to possess discipline, or be prepared for war. This cannot be learned in the sweet social walks of domestic life. The ordinary operation of civil affairs, in our beloved country, is as deadly hostile to every principle of military discipline, as a complete military government would be to a democracy."⁴³ Skelton points out that the northern campaigns of 1814 served as rallying point for regular officers. It became clear that a large, disciplined regular army, led by professional officers could prevent a repeat of the chaos of the army in 1812-1813.⁴⁴ Skelton captured the essence that a regular army served a greater societal good for the young nation.

It was in 1815 when the regular army was given the social responsibility by Congress that had previously been the mission of the militia because of the lessons learned from the War of 1812. During the Nationalist Era, President Madison wanted a larger force than the small regular force that President Jefferson had. The War of 1812 elevated the nation to the world stage and Acting Secretary of War James Monroe capitalized on this opportunity with his proposal for a standing peacetime regular army. The Act of March 1815 was a major shift in military policy because now the regular army was the nation's first line of defense and not the militia.⁴⁵ Congress therefore codified the regular army as a permanent establishment in service for the greater good of the young nation as its first line of defense.

⁴² Ibid., 98

⁴³ Ibid., 114

⁴⁴ Ibid., 114-115

⁴⁵ Ibid., 117

The final pillar of a profession is socialization, *E Pluribus Unum*, an essential part for Corporateness. The members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from nonprofessionals. This collective sense has its origins in the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional competence, a common bond of work, and the sharing of a unique social responsibility.⁴⁶ *E Pluribus Unum*, from many one, was the nation's motto highlighting the diversity of the nation yet it was one nation; this was not the mindset of the pre-1815-officer corps. The militia structure was counterproductive to forming a sense of Corporateness in a Regular Army. In the 1790s, when the army grew to fight on the frontier, there was tension among those returning to service who had previously served during the Revolution. The main issue was that of rank. There was also an inherent friction between the officers from different periods as the system upon which that the army relied was one of seniority.

Skelton illustrated the subjective civilian control of the young officer corps which was the furthest thing from a corporate organization with internalized corporate values. The officer corps had a difficult time letting go of a mindset of patronage:

“During the 1790's, the interaction between politics and the army was considerable. Not all Officers became involved, much depended on the individual's family, social standing, and station. Even though the Articles of War prohibited regulars from speaking disrespectfully of high federal officials, many officers used their political contacts to pursue their own interests both inside and outside the army. Jefferson's victory in 1800 had a sobering effect on the officer corps, since it raised the prospect of drastic cuts in military strength. The result was a partial and temporary dissociation of the army from the political arena, as regulars of the Federalist persuasion tried to assure the government of their reliability.”⁴⁷

The officer corps changed with the 1808 expansion of the army, caused by the 1807 Chesapeake incident, and with the outbreak of war in 1812. The Republicans started to dominate the officer corps through the appointment of politically affiliated officers to the expanding army. The tension grew between the expanding numbers of Republican officers versus the shrinking numbers of the established

⁴⁶ Wakin, *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, 14

⁴⁷ Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861*, 73

Federalist officers. The Federalists did not trust the Republicans.⁴⁸ “In contrast to the Federalist veterans of the “old army,” most of the officers appointed in 1808 and the War of 1812 were not committed to permanent military careers and saw no compelling reason to abjure political opinions or activities in the name of professional neutrality. Overwhelmingly Republican, they favored the use of armed force to defend national honor and interests and considered Federalist opposition to the war to border on treason.”⁴⁹

A favorable climate emerged in the later stages of the War of 1812 for the socialization of the army officer corps. A generation of young officers identified strongly with military service; the desire to elevate the army to respectable and secure standing began to weigh their personal motivations. At the beginning of the War of 1812, veterans of the Revolutionary War held 11 of the 14 senior leadership positions with an average age of 55. Generals James Wilkinson and Thomas H. Cushing were the only two officers who had experience in the regular army between the Revolutionary War and the military expansion of 1808. The preponderance were prominent Republican political figures appointed directly to high rank who viewed military service as a temporary extension of their broader leadership in state and national affairs.⁵⁰ The older generation did not have the sense of corporateness possessed by the younger generation as their own socialization developed after observing the earlier failures of the militia.

The repeated military failures in the early part of the War of 1812 opened the way for the rise of new leaders. By 1814, a number of younger men had managed, through a combination of ability and political influence, to push their way into high command positions. The seven generals on the army’s register of 1816 represented a complete turnover from the 1812 group. Their average age was thirty-seven years old and none had served in the Revolution. Four of the generals were transitional figures,

⁴⁸ At this time in our nation’s history, the CMR that existed was more in line with Subjective Civilian Control than Objective Civilian Control if you using Huntington’s model of CMR. The lack of profession of arms at this time in our nation’s history facilitates this mistrust. The Federalists felt they were heading toward a war with the British, who they supported in their struggle against the French.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 76

⁵⁰ Ibid., 110-111

wartime appointees whose careers suggest the amateurism of the early officer corps. The most significant development in the army's top leadership, however, was the rise of three generals: Alexander Macomb, Edmund P. Gaines, and Winfield Scott. Each was an ambitious professional soldier who had spent his young adulthood in the army and harbored strong ties to military service. Among them, they would dominate the army's top command structure through most of the antebellum era.⁵¹

“Scattered through the middle rungs of the postwar officer corps were scores of eager young officers whose careers resembled those of Scott, Macomb, and Gaines. Some had experience in the tiny constabulary of the Jefferson period; more had entered the army in the expansion of 1808 and at the War of 1812. Although a small but significant group were graduates of West Point, the great majority had received no formal military education, having learned their trade on the drill field and battleground. As junior officers early in the war, they had experienced the incompetent generalship, logistical breakdowns, and administrative confusion that had repeatedly brought disaster. On the other hand, they recalled with exaggerated pride the army's performance later in the conflict, especially the campaigns in the northern theater in the summer of 1814. For these veterans, the campaigns of 1814 had been the defining experience of their young lives. They developed a legend of victory, in which a disciplined core of regulars had reclaimed success from humiliating defeat, rescuing national honor and saving the republic from possible dismemberment.”⁵²

The officer corps was no longer a group of individuals. The War of 1812 served as a socialization process for a new generation of officers.

The principal characteristics of army life, the high rate of attrition, nonexistent training for young officers, and bitter personal conflicts had frustrated efforts to instill uniform, professional standards of conduct into the army's leadership, but the post war years brought managerial reform and consolidation. By the 1820's, the officer corps had achieved an orderly system of recruitment, a well-defined concept of its collective role, effective procedures for the education and professional socialization of young officers, and a high degree of regularity in its internal operations. In fact, both the officer corps and the army as a whole assumed during this period the basic form they would retain into the early twentieth century.⁵³

⁵¹ Ibid., 110-111

⁵² Ibid., 114

⁵³ Ibid., 109

It is the period immediately after the War of 1812 that the three essential elements of a profession were finally in place, the body of knowledge, service to the greater good, and socialization (E Pluribus Unum). The War of 1812 developed a generation of officers that established a social climate conducive to military reform and institutional consolidation.⁵⁴ By the early 1820's, the officer corps had acquired a clear sense of mission, an organizational structure, a means to educate and socialize aspiring professionals, and a high degree of regularity in its routine operations. The postwar transformation succeeded for two reasons. It had the support of many mid- and high-ranking officers whose wartime experiences and career ambitions committed them to military improvements. Moreover, army reform coincided with favorable conditions in the larger society, notably the postwar surge of nationalism, the stimulus of economic development, and the broader trend toward occupational specialization and bureaucratic institutional forms.⁵⁵ The American Army Officer Corps had truly become a profession of Arms by 1820.

The Evolution of a Joint Profession of Arms

"A military raid is a high risk venture that operates on the outer margins of the possible, relying on skill, daring, and a goodly measure of luck. When the raid succeeds, it acquires almost magical qualities and endows its authors with the badge of genius; hence the appeal. When it fails, it invites ridicule and the second-guessing of armchair strategists." Gary Sick, All Fall Down⁵⁶

On the evening of 24 April 1980, eight helicopters took off from the aircraft carrier USS NIMITZ, beginning a long journey at night and low altitude to Desert One, a preselected refueling point in the Iranian desert for Operation Eagle Claw, the operation to free the American Hostages held in Iran. The ground rescue forces were also in the execution phase on a different track and time schedule to Desert One aboard C-130 aircraft. Approximately two hours after takeoff, the crew of Helicopter #6

⁵⁴ Ibid., 119

⁵⁵ Ibid., 130

⁵⁶ C.E Holzworth Major USMC 1987, "Operation Eagle Claw: A Catalyst for Change in the American Military.", Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Holzworth.htm>, (accessed 29 January 2009)

received cockpit indications of an impending rotor blade failure. They landed, verified the malfunction, which was an automatic abort situation, and abandoned the aircraft. Another helicopter recovered the crew and continued the mission to Desert One. The helicopters, flying to Desert One, encountered two unexpected dust storms within hours of each other. While attempting to navigate through the second storm, larger and denser than the first dust storm, a helicopter experienced a failure of several critical navigation and flight instruments. The helicopter pilot determined that it would be unwise to continue, aborted the mission, and returned to the NIMITZ. Therefore, only six of the original eight helicopters arrived at the refueling site in intervals approximately 50 to 85 minutes later than planned. While in route, a third helicopter experienced a partial hydraulic failure, but the crew elected to continue to the refueling site. Upon landing, however, the crew and the helicopter unit commander determined that the helicopter was unsafe to continue the mission unrepaired, leaving only five mission capable helicopters.

The pre-determined minimum number of operational helicopters required at Desert One to continue the mission was six. The on-scene commander advised Commander Joint Task Force (COMJTF) his intentions to abort the operation. President Carter concurred with the decision to abort the mission and preparations began for withdrawal of the five operational helicopters, the C-130's, and the rescue force. While repositioning a helicopter to permit another to top off his fuel tanks for the return flight, the first helicopter collided with one of the refueling C-130's. Both aircraft were immediately engulfed in flames in which eight crewmembers died and five other members of the team were injured. The C-130 was loaded with members of the rescue force awaiting extraction, even greater injury and loss of life were avoided only by swift and disciplined evacuation of the burning aircraft. Shrapnel from the explosion and/or the burning ammunition struck several helicopters. At this point, with time and fuel running out for the C-130, the decision was made to transfer all helicopter crews to the remaining C-130 and to depart the area.⁵⁷

⁵⁷United States Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Professional Critique of Operation Eagle Claw. *The Holloway Report*. Admiral James Holloway, (Washington DC:, 1980), 9-10

Just like the defeats of General Harmar and St Clair in 1790 and 1791, the failed hostage rescue of Operation Eagle Claw served as a wakeup call to Congress and the nation. The failure of Operation Eagle Claw and the disaster at Desert One ended in failure and cost President Carter a second term as president. It was not only an organizational failure, due to a splintering of the U.S. armed forces, but also a failure of political will and political appreciation. When a hostage rescue operation was finally mounted, it was conceived so that the U.S. could call it off at any step along the way. Desert One turned out to be the defining moment that led to a sea-change in American military policy in the 1980s: the spread of the principle of joint operations for the U.S. armed forces (Goldwater-Nichols Act), and the companion Cohen-Nunn Act consolidating Special Forces under a U.S. Special Operations Command.”⁵⁸ Operation Eagle Claw was the catalyst for reform of the nation’s military.

It is interesting the variety of reasons for the failure of the mission offered by people who were involved or connected with the operation. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security adviser to President Carter, stated technology had failed the American people. The Holloway Commission argued the mission failed because of the mishandling of OPSEC constraints.⁵⁹ “Colonel Kyle, the Desert One Commander, led one to believe the failure was due to the lack of proper weather forecasting. Finally, General Secord concluded simply that the military and civilian leaders had lost their war fighting resolve. These conclusions were shortsighted. Maybe those who were involved with the mission were simply too close to the problem.”⁶⁰

The mission failed ultimately because of a lack of Joint Warfighting Doctrine and Joint Infrastructure to sustain a mission of this magnitude. Compounding the lack of Joint Doctrine were the

⁵⁸ Charles G. Cogan, "Desert One and Its Disorders," *The Journal of Military History*, 67, no 1 (Jan., 2003): 201-216

⁵⁹ The Holloway Report was a professional critique of the Iranians hostage rescue attempt known as Operation Eagle Claw. Joint Chiefs of Staff commissioned the report for reviewing ways to improve counterterrorism capability within the US Military. Admiral James I. Holloway III was a retired former Chief of Naval Operations at the time of the Holloway commission.

⁶⁰ C.E.Holzworth "Operation Eagle Claw: A Catalyst for Change in the American Military," 46. MG Secord was named Deputy Commander of the Joint Task Force after the failed hostage rescue; he made it his goal to improve based on the lessons learned.

parochial attitudes of the services, which together produced an environment ripe for failure.⁶¹ It was apparent that there was a lack of Joint Doctrine necessary for such a complex mission. In essence, the military lacked a Joint body of knowledge to draw from, very similar to the OJT days of the early army. Within the profession of arms, separate service cultures limited the ability to expand the profession's next logical evolution to a Joint profession of arms. General Secords' comment regarding the loss of war-fighting resolve implies a lack of the commitment to serving a greater good. E Pluribus Unum or in this case Joint socialization was not present; in fact, service rivalries were prevalent throughout the operation. There were many groups that were pulled together to execute Operation Eagle Claw and the lack of interoperability, integration, and interdependency of a joint socialization process hampered the operation. As Holzworth so adeptly captures, "The mission failed in the staff planning offices and in the training areas long before the first aircraft launched for Desert One."⁶²

As with most of military failures, a nation learns and adjusts from the experience and provides remedies to those problems identified. As of the 1980's the professions of arms were still parochial professions that needed to evolve beyond their service cultures to evolve a joint military profession of arms. Today history looks at what was once considered a failure as the single most important event that is responsible for military success today when he stated: Operation Eagle Claw was a catalyst for a Revolution in Military Affairs. The GNA, Joint Doctrine and SOF are three major examples of that revolution. In the final analysis, Operation Eagle Claw will be remembered for the improvements it forced in the military. ⁶³

The legislation in 1986 and 1987, following many years of congressional debate and testimony, made the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) accompanied by the Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the GNA (CNA). Gold-water-Nichols spelled the end of the independence of the services, Army, Navy, and Air

⁶¹ Ibid.,45

⁶² Ibid., 46

⁶³ Ibid., 46

Force, and strengthened the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as the principle advisor to the President of the United States, while it also created the Operational Combatant Commanders based on geography and Functional Combatant Commanders based on capabilities. The CJCS became, as some would describe him as the head among equals, from then on, the emphasis was on joint operations.⁶⁴

The GNA also involved the reorganization and the consolidation of all the Special Operations Forces (SOF) under a single command called the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), located in Tampa, Florida. The USSOCOM commander furnishes units to the commanders of the geographic commands. Once these units arrive in theater, they operate under the orders of the regional commander, except in the case of certain sensitive operations, which can be run from the United States. The USSOCOM commander controls the doctrine, training, and budgeting for all Special Operations Forces, which was once a function of the services.⁶⁵ Cogan summarized the major elements of the GNA and CNA as strengthening the CJCS's role, the creation of Combatant Command Structure, the shifting of the services to resourcing functions, and the establishment and consolidation of all Special Operations Forces under United States Special Operations Command.⁶⁶ What Cogan does not emphasize is Title IV of the GNA which codifies in law the body of knowledge elements of Joint Professional Military Education and the corporate/socialization aspects of Joint Officer Development, which remain as catalysts for a truly Joint Profession of Arms. There was no better place to observe and foster the new Joint Profession of Arms than in USSOCOM as SOF is inherently Joint by its very nature.

⁶⁴ Those equals being the Service Chiefs whose role transitioned to that of solely as resourcing headquarters providing trained and ready forces to the Combatant Commanders

⁶⁵ Cogan, "Desert One and Its Disorders," 216

⁶⁶ Charles G. Cogan was a Senior Research Associate at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University when he published his article. He spent thirty-seven years in the Central Intelligence Agency, lastly as CIA Chief in Paris. After leaving the CIA, he earned a doctorate in public administration at Harvard. He was the chief of the Near East and South Asia Division in the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency between mid-1979 and mid-1984.

The reality that the American military had to become a joint force was apparent after WWII to one visionary who was responsible for establishing the Industrial War College. “General Dwight D Eisenhower spoke about his experiences during World War II; ‘Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort.’ That is a clear mandate to focus adequate resources on joint education and training.”⁶⁷ The Department of Defense Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) CJCSI 1800.01C institutes the essence of General Eisenhower comments. The documents focus on two pillars of the profession of arms, a body of knowledge and socialization, or E Pluribus Unum, to develop a Joint Profession of Arms to serve a greater good, the critical third element of a profession.

“PME – both Service and Joint--is the critical element in officer development and is the foundation of a joint learning continuum. The PME vision understands that young officers join their particular Service, receive training, and education in a joint context, gain experience, pursue self-development, and over the breadth of their careers, become senior leaders of the joint force. Performance and potential are the alchemy of this growth, but nothing ensures that they are properly prepared leaders more than the care given to the content of their training, education, experience and self-development opportunities. My PME vision entails ensuring that officers are properly prepared for their leadership roles at every level of activity and employment, and through this, ensure that the US Armed forces remain capable of defeating today's threat and tomorrow's.”⁶⁸

The CJCS Instruction Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01C, is the proverbial bible for Joint Professional Military Education. The CJCS’s responsibilities as defined by law are: (1) Formulating policies for coordinating the military education and training members of the Armed Forces, (2) Advising and assisting the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) by periodically reviewing and revising the curriculum of each school of NDU to enhance the education and

⁶⁷ Henry H. Shelton, "Professional Education: The Key to Transformation." *Parameters*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA:U.S. Army War College) Autumn 2001: 11-12

⁶⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction. Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) CJCSI 1800.01C. (Washington DC, DoD 2005), 1

training of officers in joint matters, and (3) Advising and Assisting the SecDef through the designation and certification of all elements of a JPME. The OPMEP provides policies, procedures, identifies the objectives, and fixes the responsibilities necessary to fulfill his statutory PME requirements.⁶⁹

The OPMEP established an operational continuum for PME which; “identifies areas of emphasis at each educational level and provides joint curriculum guidance for PME institutions. It is a comprehensive frame of reference depicting the progressive nature of PME and JPME, guiding an officer’s individual development over time consist of Pre-commissioning, Primary, Intermediate, Senior and General/Flag officer levels of education.”⁷⁰ The program relies heavily on the individual services and the National Defense University, the Chairman’s educational arm, to implement the program. The OPMEP goes on to point out that, “the continuum also recognizes both the distinctiveness and interdependence of joint and Service schools in officer education. Service schools, in keeping with their role of developing service specialists, place emphasis on education primarily from a Service perspective in accordance with joint learning areas and objectives. Joint schools emphasize joint education from a joint perspective.”⁷¹ This interdependence of PME and JPME on the Services in itself fostered the development of the Joint body of knowledge.


The OPMEP clearly states that the development and progression through PME continuum for an officer is the responsibility of the service. There is, however, a symbiotic relationship between PME and JPME. The following chart illustrates the two intertwined systems, but GNA takes it further by forcing the integration of the joint profession of arms through defining specific joint instructors and student officer ratios that ensure the quality of the joint educational environment. The immersion of the joint ratios occurs at the ILE level and continues through the rest of the officer’s education. The statutory requirements placed on the military by the GNA serves as a forcing function, tearing down the parochial

⁶⁹ Ibid., 2

⁷⁰ Ibid., A-A-1

⁷¹ Ibid., A-A-1

service walls seen prior to Desert One and elevates the quality of education that all military officers must receive.

GRADE	CADETSHIPMAN	O-1O-3O-3	O-4	O-5O-6	O-7O-8O-9
EDUCATION LEVEL	PRECOMMISSIONING	PRIMARY	INTERMEDIATE	SENIOR	GENERALFLAG
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND COURSES	Service Academies	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Branch, Warfare or Staff Specialty Schools	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Air Command and Staff CollegeArmy Command and General Staff SchoolCollege of Naval Command and StaffMarine Corps Command and Staff CollegeJFSC, Joint and Combined Warfighting SchoolJFSC, Joint Advanced Warfighting School¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Air War CollegeArmy War CollegeCollege of Naval WarfareMarine Corps War CollegeIndustrial College of the Armed Forces¹National War College¹JFSC, Joint and Combined Warfighting SchoolJFSC, Joint Advanced Warfighting School¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none">CAPSTONEJoint Functional Component Commander CoursesJoint Flag Officer Warfighting CoursePINNACLE
	ROTC	OCS/OTS			
LEVELS OF WAR EMPHASIZED	Conceptual Awareness of all Levels				
		TACTICAL	OPERATIONAL	STRATEGIC	
FOCUS OF MILITARY EDUCATION	Introduction to Services Missions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Assigned Branch, Warfare or Staff Specialty	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Warfighting within the context of Operational ArtIntro to theater strategy and plans, national military strategy and national security strategyDevelop analytical capabilities and creative thought	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Service Schools: strategic leadership, national military strategy and theater strategyNMIC: national security strategyICAF: national security strategy with emphasis on the resource components	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Joint matters and national securityInteragency processMultinational operations
JOINT EMPHASIS	<u>Joint Introduction</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">National Military Capabilities and OrganizationFoundation of Joint Warfare	<u>Joint Awareness</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Joint Warfare FundamentalsJoint Campaigning	<u>JPM Phase I</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">National military strategyNational military capabilities command structures and strategic guidanceJoint doctrine and conceptsJoint and multinational forces at the operational level of warJoint planning and execution processesInformation operations, C2 and battlespace awarenessJoint force and joint requirements development	<u>JPM Phase I</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">National security strategyNational planning systems and processesNational and theater military strategy, campaigning and organizationJoint doctrine, force and requirements developmentInformation operations, C2 and battlespace awarenessJoint strategic leader development	<u>JPM Phase II</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">National security strategyNational military strategy and organizationJoint warfare, theater strategy and campaigningNational and joint planning systems and processesIntegration of Joint, IA and multinational capabilitiesInformation ops, C2 and battlespace awarenessJoint force and joint requirements developmentJoint strategic leader development
			<u>AIJPM and JPM Phase II</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">National strategic security systems and guidance and command structuresTheater strategy and campaigningIntegration of Joint interagency (IA) and multinational capabilitiesInformation operationsJoint planning systems		<u>CAPSTONE</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">National security strategyJoint operational artJoint Functional Component Commander Courses & JFCOMNational security strategyNational planning systems and organizationNational military strategy & organizationTheater strategy, campaigning and military operations in Joint, interagency, and multinational environmentInformation operationsStrategic leader development <u>PINNACLE</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Joint/Combined force developmentBuilding & commanding the joint combined forceThe JFC and the IA, NCA, NMS and the Congress

⁷² Figure 1. *The Officer PME Continuum*

The top row of the chart is the grade of the officer along the PME continuum. The far left column lists the major subjects of the continuum as the educational institutions, the focused levels of war for that grade, service educational focus, and joint emphasis. This chart illustrates the symbiotic relationship within the services and the joint body of knowledge pillar of the profession of arms.

Education is important both for learning facts and for affecting attitudes and values. Specifically, joint education can broaden an officer's knowledge beyond his own military service to joint, multiservice matters and can help the officer develop a joint perspective. The Goldwater-Nichols Act would enhance joint education both to meet the increased responsibilities of the joint elements and to provide officers with joint perspectives. Education on joint matters is a basic link between a service competent officer and a joint competent officer. Further, joint education is a

⁷² Ibid., A-A-A-1

major way to change the professional military culture so that officers accept and support the strengthened joint elements.⁷³

The House Arms Services Committees report on Professional Military Education, affectionately known as the ‘Skelton’ report, captured the importance of this symbiotic relationship between the service and joint profession of arms. It was obvious in the last sentence that the committee realized that not only was the building of the body of knowledge pillar essential to a joint profession of arms but that the corporateness/socialization pillar was equally as important to develop and the first step in that process occurred in the university.⁷⁴

The Demands of the 21st Century security environment are markedly different from those that shaped the manpower requirements and personnel systems and policies that are used in the (Defense) Department today. The current set of human resources policies and practices will not meet the needs of the 21st Century if left unchanged.” (The Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy)

The National Defense Act of 2002 independently examined how a joint military would affect Joint Officer Development (JOD) and Joint Officer Management (JOM) because of the impact a joint profession of arms would have on the Secretary of Defense’s ability to meet the future challenges.

Framing a Strategic Approach for Joint Officer Management and Who Is “Joint”? *New Evidence from the 2005 Joint Officer Management Census Survey* was a report prepared for the Office of the SecDef by the RAND Corporation to “look beyond manpower issues to establish the context for officer development in joint matters.”⁷⁵ One of the recommendations of the reports was for the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop a strategic plan for JOM and JPME because of the importance of developing a viable joint profession of arms. The DOD plan states, “In 1986, Title IV of the GNA codified joint officer personnel policies, providing specific personnel management guidance on how to identify, educate, train, promote,

⁷³ Armed Services Committee, Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress, Cong. Rec., 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1989 H. Rep., 11

⁷⁴ The Skelton Report is named after Missouri Representative Ike Skelton, not to be confused with William B Skelton the author earlier mentioned this paper.

⁷⁵ Harry J. Thie, Margaret C. Harrell, Roland J. Yardley, Marian Oshiro, Holly Ann Potter, Peter Schirmer, and Nelson Lim, *Framing a Strategic Approach for Joint Officer Management* (Alexandria, VA: RAND Corporation), 52

and assign officers to joint duties. The joint war fighting capabilities possessed by today's U.S. military matured because of the emphasis and impetus of the GNA. While the operational forces developed into a comfortable state of jointness, the system used for JOM has not kept pace."⁷⁶ One of the challenges for joint strategy is the differences in the various service cultures, similar to the militia versus regular army frictions early in the nation's history. The Rand studies concluded that the services would resort to systems that would not foster jointness, if DOD did not evolve past its current state of JOM.

The initial GNA system of Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) was a time-based system, based on officers filling Joint Designated Authorization List (JDAL) positions. There was no doubt, based on the success of joint operations in a post GNA environment that this strategy was working. Senior leaders talk about jointness of operations, planning, and strategy, especially as they look to future operations. Although this aspect of jointness is true, leadership has not supported JOM as rapidly. "The service personnel managers note the difficulty in fitting joint assignments into officers' career paths and are reflective of individual service cultures that are generally less respectful of joint experience than of that gained within their services."⁷⁷ The system severely limited the socialization process of the joint profession of arms despite the fact that more and more officers had joint experience. The Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) was a good first step in creating the second pillar of the joint profession of arms, Corporateness /socialization. The Skelton report captured the sentiments of the House Armed Services Committee panel regarding the understanding of the importance of service competencies in having an effective joint force.

"They must be expert in their own warfare specialty and have a broad and deep understanding, based upon experience and professional military education, of the major elements of their service. The more familiar they are with the other services, the less likely they will be arbitrarily to choose solutions favoring their own service. They will also be more capable of effectively integrating multi-service capabilities and joint solutions to military problems. As they understand more about the other services, JSOs should turn to joint command and control, theater planning, and national military and national security strategy. In the view of the panel, the joint

⁷⁶ Department of Defense, Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education.(Washington DC, 2006),5

⁷⁷ Thie, Framing a Strategic Approach for Joint Officer Management, xvii


specialist most consistent with the law is an officer, expert in his or her own warfare specialty and service, who develops a deep understanding, broad knowledge, and keen appreciation of the integrated employment and support of all services' capabilities in the pursuit of national objectives.”⁷⁸

The events of 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror identified the need to take the socialization process to a higher level in order to build on the intent of the GNA. In 2005, the National Defense Authorization Act directed the DOD to develop a strategic plan for JOM and JOD linking JOD to experienced-based accomplishments focused on the overall missions and goals of the DOD, as set forth in the most recent national military strategy under section 153(d) of title 10, United States Code. “Such plans shall be developed for the purpose of ensuring that sufficient numbers of officers fully qualified in occupational specialties involving combat operations are available as necessary to meet the needs of the Department for qualified officers who are operationally effective in the joint environment.”⁷⁹ DOD is evolving its Joint Qualification System from the traditional Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) approach to an experience approach. The Rand report, *Framing a Strategic Approach for Joint Officer Management*, discussed that the profession of arms relied on OJT to master their profession, and history repeats itself over 200 years later regarding the joint profession of arms. In a follow up Rand survey, *Who Is “Joint”? New Evidence from the 2005 Joint Officer Management Census Survey*, a critical analysis of the JDAL as well as Non JDAL positions was studied. What they found was that 79% of non-JDAL positions overwhelming provided significant experiences in Joint, Interagency, and Multinational operations. The new experienced based path Experience Joint Duty Assignment (E-JDA) to Joint qualification system recognizes this joint experience and relies on it to build the joint profession of arms. The Department of Defense fact sheet, see figure 2, clearly illustrates the differences between the S-JDAL

⁷⁸ Armed Services Committee, Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress, Cong. Rec., 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1989 H. Rep., 55-56

⁷⁹ Department of Defense, Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education, 21

and the current E-JDA.⁸⁰ The GNA rectified the shortcomings of a service-centric profession of arms in Ch IV by directing the JOD and JOM to the DOD. The JOD and JOM serve as a forcing function for the development of a joint body of knowledge and joint socialization, *E Pluribus Unum*, which established two pillars of a joint profession of arms. The Combatant Commanders benefitted from this new joint profession of arms, the new joint profession of arms flourishes at USSOCOM.



⁸¹ Figure 2 Joint Officer Program Fact Sheet

⁸⁰ Office of Under Secretary of Defense Military Personnel Policy, Defense Link, "JOM Media Fact Sheet", http://www.defenselink.mil/pdf/JOM_Media_FactSheet20070707.pdf, (accessed 5 February 2009)

⁸¹ Ibid.

Born from crisis and shaped through experience, today's special operations capability did not come easily. Contemporary Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the product of tragedy, vision, and the innovation of Congress. Unique authorities given to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) empower Special Operations Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen to perform diverse yet critical missions. Exceptional training, enhanced education, cutting-edge technology, and force maturity, coupled with the authority, agility, and willingness to change, form a responsive framework fundamental to Special Operations Forces defeating adversaries across the globe.⁸²

Operation Eagle Claw illustrated the need, not only for jointness but also for the US to possess a viable special operations capability. Although terrorism was the catalyst, there was an acknowledgement of a requirement to build a force capable of executing special operations in the future. The reasons varied but the reality of the Cold War's proxy engagements throughout the world, coupled with the rise of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist operations below the Cold Warrior's radar, clearly called for a force capable of operating in such a fluid environment. No country was immune from the growing scourge of terrorism. The question became did the US need the capability to address the growing threat and what would it take to develop and maintain such a force?

As the US fought the Cold War against the Soviet Union, the resourcing effort focused on building a force capable of fighting and winning a major conflict with the Soviet Union in Europe. Desert One opened the nation's eyes to the need for viable and reliable capability to address the growing scourge of terrorism. Today, that scourge manifests itself through irregular warfare; the nation's prestige cannot afford another failure like Desert One. "In the post-September 11th world, irregular warfare has emerged as the dominant form of warfare confronting the United States, its allies and its partners; accordingly, guidance must account for distributed, long-duration operations, including unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stabilization and reconstruction operations."⁸³ If Desert One had not opened the eyes of the nation to the gaps that existed in the

⁸²General Bryan D. Brown, "Challenges of the 21st Century," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 40,(1st Quarter 2006):38

⁸³ U.S. Department of Defense, *The Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (2006), Donald Rumsfeld, Congressional Report: 36

capability to conduct special operation at the time, and had Congress not acted, the country would be ill-prepared to operate and succeed in the post 9/11 world.

Congress not only created USSOCOM but it put the *special* in Special Operations Command. The GNA mandated a unified functional special operations command led by a four star general, which the services resisted. It created an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict at the DOD, as well as a low-intensity conflict coordinating board within the National Security Council, and SOF Major Force Program (MFP)–11. The legislations goals involved Civil Military Relations⁸⁴ oversight for USSOCOM and its missions, objective expertise, diverse military advice on special operations for the President and the Secretary of Defense, improve interagency planning and coordination, and increase SOF capabilities in joint doctrine and training, intelligence support, command and control, budget authority, personnel management, and mission planning.⁸⁵ The result was a functional Combatant Command with service-like and operational responsibilities, in essence creating what some would call almost a fifth service and yet was symbiotic with the other services.

The creation of USSOCOM did not occur by accident, but rather through a conscience decision by a group of legislators who disagreed with the services' approach and acted accordingly. The services did not improve special operations capabilities prior to GNA; for similar reasons they were reluctant in supporting JOM. They did not see the important role of SOF in future conflicts and had an attitude that special operations forces were counterproductive to the individual service cultures. The consolidation of all of the services' SOF under a single headquarters forced interoperability, integration, and interdependence among the services SOF. One of the greatest successes of the establishment of USSOCOM was an unintended experiment not only in a joint profession of arms but even more in that it

⁸⁴ With CMR as a principle part of the legislations intent, it is important to remember the key element of Objective Civilian Control is a Profession of Arms. With the goal being CMR oversight one could infer at this point that a SOF profession of arms was not just a byproduct of the creation of USSOCOM but became a requirement in order to meet the obligations that came with OCC.

⁸⁵ Brown, Challenges of the 21st Century, 39

set the conditions for the creation of a special operations forces profession of arms, fostering a SOF profession of arms out of necessity.

Like the early national history, the profession of arms evolved out of a necessity. What Eagle Claw began was a realization that there was a need for the profession of arms to evolve once again. This did not mean to discard the lessons of the services' profession of arms but rather build upon them. With USSOCOM's unique responsibilities, as the only combatant command with forces permanently assigned, it only made sense that in the post GNA-era a joint profession of arms would develop and flourish faster in that environment. In his testimony, in 2008 to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Olson alluded to a SOF profession of arms when he said, "Our personnel must be capable of planning and leading a wide range of lethal and non-lethal special operations missions in complex, ambiguous environments. This specific requirement underpins expectations that SOF will continue a military culture of initiative and innovation at every level. USSOCOM will continue to work closely with the services to ensure that the conventional force enablers upon which we depend remain a part of our future operations."⁸⁶ It takes a body of knowledge, sense of corporateness/socialization and a desire or spirit to serve a greater good; in essence, it takes a SOF profession of arms.

The profession of arms has continually evolved throughout the nation's history. Often the motivation for change was adversity ranging from disastrous defeats in the early frontiers and the near total failure at the beginning of the War of 1812; the profession of arms evolved in order to serve the nation and its people. This was no different with the tragic failure of Operation Eagle Claw. From the ashes of Desert One, the nation's military and its professions of arms evolved in order to create what exists today. From those ashes arose, and because of GNA, a Joint and SOF profession of arms.

⁸⁶ U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, *Posture Statement of Special Operations Forces*, Admiral Eric Olson Commander USSOCOM (Washington DC 2008), 4

SOF Profession of Arms and the Special Forces Officer.

In an essay, I wrote a few years ago, I reminisced about my childhood fascination with the hat that my father wore as a sailor during World War I and how it connected me to his military past, of which I am still so proud. I have come to view that hat as much more than a childhood curiosity: that hat represents all of our pasts as Americans; it speaks of the countless told and untold stories of warriors who have given so much to ensure our freedom today and tomorrow.

Ike Skelton⁸⁷

The hat that Congressmen Skelton referred to was not a Green Beret but rather the hat of a proud American who served on the USS Missouri. Although a symbol, it represented so much to a young boy who would one day be in a position to give back to the nation's military. The words of President Kennedy are just as relevant today as they were 27 years ago when he said, "The Green Beret is again becoming a symbol of excellence, a badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom. I know the United States Army will live up to its reputation for imagination, resourcefulness, and spirit as we meet this challenge."⁸⁸ Like Ike Skelton, a piece of headgear inspired a man, who happened to be President, to look toward the future and look to shape how the Army would meet those challenges. Both politicians saw a need to create a joint environment and the other to adapt to meet modern challenges with modern Special Forces. If it were not for President Kennedy's interest in Irregular Warfare and his support for the Green Berets, there was a very real chance that the organization would have faded into the military history books.

USSOCOM's mission is to provide fully capable Special Operations Forces (SOF) to defend the United States and its interests and to plan and synchronize DoD operations against terrorist networks.⁸⁹ In order to accomplish that mission USSOCOM, through its service components, ensures its forces are, like

⁸⁷ Ike Skelton, *Whispers of Warriors Essays on the New Joint Era*, (Washington, D.C National Defense University Press, 2004), xi

⁸⁸ John F Kennedy, "Quotations of John F Kennedy", John F. Kennedy, JFK Presidential Library, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Quotations+of+John+F+Kennedy.htm>, (accessed April 5, 2009). In a letter written by President Kennedy to the United States Army regarding Army Special Warfare on 4/11/62.

⁸⁹ Olson, Posture Statement of Special Operations Forces, 2

the services, trained and ready to accomplish special operations as directed in support of the Geographical Combatant Commanders or the National Command Authority. USSOCOM has four service components: the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), the Air Forces Special Operations Command (AFSOC), the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC), and the Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM). The total force structure for USSOCOM is approximately 53,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. The preponderance of the forces of USSOCOM are in USASOC which has approximately 51% of the forces while AFSOC has 28%, NAVSPECWARCOM has 15%, MARSOC has 3% and assorted SOF Headquarters make up the remaining percentage of USSOCOM forces. The phrase ‘SOF is inherently Joint’ comes from not only the makeup of the organization but also how SOF operates today. Over half of USASOC, the largest service component in USSOCOM, is made of forces from the United States Special Forces Command (USASFC).⁹⁰ The command’s responsibility, like USSOCOM and USASOC, is to provide trained and ready Army Special Forces, or Green Berets, to the Combatant Commanders.

The United States Army’s John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWC), a major subordinate command of USASOC, assesses, selects, and trains Special Forces Officers to operate independently in today’s ambiguous world. The three pillars of a profession exist for the SF Officer starting with Service to a Greater Good, Socialization/Corporateness (*E Pluribus Unum*) and finally the Body of Knowledge. These pillars are the foundation for a SOF profession of arms and must continue to grow and mature to serve the Nation, the Joint Force, the Army, and SOF community at the senior field grade level. It is important to highlight that a SOF profession of arms does not detract from the service or joint profession of arms but rather builds upon the service and joint professions to develop a more synergistic and competent profession, it is not a zero sum gain.⁹¹

⁹⁰ LTG Robert Wagner Commander USASOC, “Operation Just Cause Case Study”, Lecture sponsored by the CGSC SOF Education Depart in support of ILE SOF Studies program, April 2008.

⁹¹ The order the author will approach the pillars of a profession at this point are service to a greater good, Corporateness/socialization, and the body of knowledge. The intent is to trace the pillars as they develop in the SOF Profession of Arms for an SF Officer.

Unconventional warriors are not new phenomenon but existed in our country since its founding.

“The second Seminole War did not follow the precedent set in earlier Indian wars by producing a single dazzling stroke by a spectacularly brilliant leader. No fewer than seven American commanders would try and fail to bring the war to a successful conclusion. When confronted with superior firepower and at a tactical disadvantage, the Seminoles simply dispersed into small bands and continued to fight a guerrilla war . . . best suited to the terrain and their own temperament. Where other eastern Indians could usually be depended upon to follow the rules of the game—to defend a fixed position and be routed—the Seminoles . . . regularly rejected pitched battles and instead relied on ambushes and raids to bleed the Army, sap its strength, and generally discourage its leadership.”⁹²

It takes a special type of individual to become an unconventional warrior. The SF Officer, like all other officers in the army, volunteered to give up their individuality to join the army in service to the greater good, the Nation. In order for an officer to join the Special Forces Regiment he must once again volunteer, as outlined in US Army Recruiting Command Pamphlet, USAREC PAM 601-35⁹³, to join a special fraternity of soldiers. The document provides the information for officers on how to volunteer for SF assessment, training, and assignment. The Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) Course, the first step of the journey in joining the SOF profession of arms for a SF Officer, is a 24-day assessment program broken into four weeks designed to assess and select officers for the SF Detachment Officer Qualifying Course (SFDOQC). SFAS uses a “Whole Man” approach that assesses each officer for six attributes important for all Special Forces Soldiers. These attributes are intelligence, trainability, physical fitness, motivation, influence, and judgment.⁹⁴ The SF volunteer applies with the knowledge that his selection for SF training is not guaranteed, displaying the personal and professional courage to subject them to the physically and mentally demands of the selection program.

The officer participates in a variety of well-designed activities with the purpose of creating various forms of physical and mental stress. The cadre assesses potential and qualities through behavioral observation, analysis via performance measure, and recording data. The environment is neutral, neither

⁹² Skelton, *Whispers of Warriors Essays on the New Joint Era*, 124

⁹³ This is the regulation that governs the Army’s process to branch transfer to Special Forces

⁹⁴ US Army Recruiting Command, *In-Service Special Forces Recruiting Program USAREC Pamphlet 601-25*, (Fort Knox Kentucky, US Army, 2006), 4

encouraging nor discouraging the candidates, with the intent of providing minimal information and absolutely no performance feedback to candidates.⁹⁵ The differences between Elite Forces and Special Operations Forces are functions of status, selection, and size. The *Corps d'elite* are designated based on unusually effective performance against the enemy; any organization can receive the modicum of elite if it performs well. The more critical distinction between the *Corps d'Elite* is in the selection process of Special Operations Forces. A selection program focused on physical stamina and psychological stability under duress are the distinguishing characteristic of SOF over the *Corps d'Elite*. Special Operations Forces look for the ability to operate independently in the face of adverse odds and eliminate those that cannot.⁹⁶ A, aforementioned, selection process is the fundamental first step in the SF Officers journey into their SOF profession of arms. SFAS is a common experience and a socialization event that all Green Berets go through. The author determined that SFAS better fits under the serving a greater good pillar of a profession because it does not provide corporate training even though some socialization does occur.⁹⁷

SF Officers must be airborne qualified meanings he must volunteer if not already airborne qualified. This makes him for all practical purpose a triple volunteer in their service to the nation and at times at great personal and professional risk. There are many individual motivations for joining, but the overwhelming majority is of an intrinsic nature. There is no monetary gain for an officer to serve in the SF Regiment and more often than not there is a greater hardship placed upon SF Officers; yet, they chose to serve something bigger then themselves. "The reluctance of the traditionalist within the military to maintain units such as Special Forces stem from the belief that such units would detract from the image of other regular Army units. Moreover, it is maintained that such units would tend to attract the most

⁹⁵ Ibid., 4

⁹⁶ James D. Kiras, *Special Operations and Strategy*. (New York, NY: Routeledge, 2006), 6

⁹⁷ The officer is at this point is essentially in a tryout phase for Special Forces Training. SFAS meets James D. Kiras criteria for a selection process which accesses the physical and mental stamina of the candidate and stability required to succeed in Special Forces.

combat-oriented individuals, thus reducing the capability of other regular units.”⁹⁸ Although written in 1975, prior to the establishment of the USSOCOM and the Special Forces Branch in 1987, Sarkesian identified an underlying attitude prevalent among traditionalist within the Army. An officer interested in joining SF took a professional risk to do so and if he was not successful in completing the process, he faced potential retribution. The individual that chooses to volunteer therefore takes a personal and professional risk to become a SF Officer because, as Dr. Klass described, they have a spirit, a personal and private sense of dedication to society; this is what makes a profession great. This professional spirit is the result of the association of men of superior type with a common ideal of service above gain, excellence above quality, self-expression beyond pecuniary motive and loyalty to a professional code above individual advantage.⁹⁹ It is fitting that Special Forces Officers are known as the Quiet Professionals. There is no other branch in the US Army Competitive Category that must go through an assessment and selection program to be a member.

The SF branch is a non-accessed army branch, which means that the SF Officer must volunteer to leave their existing Army Basic Branch to join Special Forces as a Captain; the corporate and socialization journey begins. The officer submits an application to Special Forces Branch and, if selected by a board of Special Forces Officers, he attends SFAS as previously described. This board is a self-regulating body of senior SF Officers ensuring the best-qualified applicants attend SFAS. William Goode, as discussed earlier, talked of the importance of a profession to self-regulate in order to have a higher caliber student because of the power and prestige of the profession. Goode also points out that the members identify and affiliate more with the profession and for all practical purposes, the profession is more likely to be a terminal occupation.¹⁰⁰ The creation of the Special Forces Branch in 1987 made

⁹⁸ Sam C. Sarkesian, *The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society*, (Chicago: Nelson-Hall , 1975), 95

⁹⁹ Klass, What is a profession?, 85

¹⁰⁰ Goode, “Encroachment, Charlatanism, and the Emerging Profession: Psychology, Sociology, and Medicine, 903

Goode's comments a reality regarding identity, affiliation, and a terminal occupation. Prior to that time, officers served in SF job intermittently while retaining their basic branch.

The officers selected then attend the SFDOQC to begin their training; this is after completing their Captains Career Course (Basic Level of Education (BLE) PME) in order to ground them in their service profession. SFDOQC is the initial socialization process to teach and develop the skills necessary for effective utilization of the SF Soldier. The duties in Special Forces primarily involve participation in Special Operations interrelated fields of unconventional warfare.¹⁰¹ The four phases of SFDOQC are individual skills phase, Military Occupational Skills (MOS) phase, language training, and collective training phase.¹⁰² Upon completion of SFDOQC, the officer relinquishes his assessed basic Army branch, transfers to the Special Forces Branch, and is a U.S. Army Green Beret.

The Special Forces Officer's mission is to operate across the full range of military operations throughout the operational continuum. The organizations they lead provide a variety of options where the commitment of conventional military forces is not feasible or appropriate. Special Forces possess capabilities that are not available elsewhere in the armed forces, specifically their capability to conduct unconventional warfare. SF Officers must operate in Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational environments at the operational and strategic levels.¹⁰³ The SFQDOCs' focus is on preparing the officer for detachment command; this is an apprentice level position within the SF Community. It is through a SOF profession of arms that the Socialization/Corporateness process continues to flourish and develop the SF Officer throughout their career. Like early in the nation's history, OJT serves as the primary piece to the SF Officer's body of knowledge once the SF Captain proceeds past his detachment command experience.

¹⁰¹ U.S. Army Recruiting Command, In-Service Special Forces Recruiting Program, 8

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 9

¹⁰³ U.S. Army, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management." Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3. (Washington, D.C., 2007), 159

The seven core tasks that a SF Officer must perform are Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Counter Terrorism, Counter Proliferations, and support to Information Operations.¹⁰⁴ The one core task that is exclusively a Special Forces task, often referred as the most difficult, is Unconventional Warfare. The SFDOQC prepares an SF Officer to serve as a Detachment Commander through training and education with the focus on company grade level skills rather than skills needed to perform at the field grade level.¹⁰⁵ The SF Officer, unlike his peers, often operates in the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational environment, for which BME does not adequately prepare them. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently called for institutional support for non-traditional capabilities in an attempt to highlight the challenges of balancing conventional strategic forces with irregular-warfare and stabilization capabilities.¹⁰⁶ The SF Officer plays a critical role within Irregular Warfare as the Army's proponent for Unconventional Warfare and as such, it is critical to build upon their SOF corporate/socialization throughout their career. Although the SF Officer goes through Socialization as SFODQC there is a continual socialization requirement for the SF Officer to develop. This often occurs at the organization level and is dependent on individual commanders to continue the socializations process for SF field grade officers. In the institutional army, there are informal efforts to develop opportunities for SF Officers to expand their sense of Corporateness. Although this can best be described as ad hoc, it requires vigilance to keep it from going the way of Wayne's Legion. SF has the second critical pillar of a profession of arms at the company grade level. The seeds of socialization exist at the army's ILE program for field grade officers but without constant attention and formalization of a SOF profession of arms, it may wither on the vine. Sarkesian points out, "The traditionalist probably dislike the fact that such units operate on the fringes of traditional perceptions of

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 160

¹⁰⁵ The idea of a SF Advance course, modeled after the basic branch courses, arises from time to time. It would be better for the SOF Profession of Arms to utilize and recognize ILE as the institution to serve that role as Body of Knowledge venue for SF Officers. This would foster Army, Joint, and SOF socialization.

¹⁰⁶ Joe Gould, The InsideDefense.com., http://defense.iwpnewsstand.com/defensenewsstand_spclsubj.asp?s=qdr09 (accessed March 22, 2009).

professionalism—that they tend to attract the maverick and do not operate according to the book.”¹⁰⁷

Operating on the fringes is exactly where the SF officer needs to operate if he is to be successful in irregular warfare. Throughout his career the SF field grade officer’s socialization process is key to building the SOF’s corporate leaders for tomorrow.

“Education is not a single event, but a continuous process that spans a lifetime. It takes a generation of leaders growing through educational programs to develop the broad base of competent SOF strategic thinkers needed in the joint SOF community. Title 10, U.S. Code, empowers the Commander, USSOCOM, to conduct specialized courses of instruction for commissioned and noncommissioned officers, and to monitor the promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional military education of special operations forces officers”¹⁰⁸

The body of knowledge is unique to each service. USSOCOM is accused of being a service-like organization from time-to-time based on its acquisition and budget authorities. While these tangible authorities could support such a statement, it is the Title 10 US Code requirement to monitor promotions, assignments, retentions, training and professional military education that makes USSOCOM service-like with the responsibility to facilitate a SOF profession of arms. Admiral Olson, the current Commander of USSOCOM, in his testimony to Congress in 2008 discussed professional military education as critical to the development, sustainment, and advancement of SOF. Admiral Olson, as did the architects of the GNA/NCA, understood the importance of the professional military education system to provide the nation with the very best SOF capabilities.¹⁰⁹ As mentioned earlier, the university is the cornerstone for any profession, for the Green Beret that University is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Kiras reinforces the need for the body of knowledge when he wrote, “Special operations skills are highly perishable and require constant training and education to maintain at the peak of efficiency. The training is performed jointly on a small scale to ensure that the various service

¹⁰⁷ Sarkesian, *The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society*, 95

¹⁰⁸ Joint Special Operations University. *Strategic Plan Academic Years 2006-2013*. (Tampa, FL USSOCOM 2006) 11

¹⁰⁹ For the purpose of this paper, the author will focus on the Special Forces Officer due to the limitation of this monograph but the arguments could be applied to other members of the SOF community.

components understand each other's unique methods of operations and requirements.”¹¹⁰ Graduate level education is likewise critical to sustaining the SOF profession of arms for the SF field grade officer; there are opportunities available if the officer pursues them but it is of an ad hoc nature.

The SF Officer, as a member of the Army, attends ILE as part of their service professional development.

“ILE is the Army's formal education program for majors. It is a tailored resident education program designed to prepare new field-grade officers for their next 10 years of Service. It produces field-grade officers with a Warrior Ethos and Joint, expeditionary mindset, who are grounded in warfighting doctrine, and who have the technical, tactical, and leadership competencies to be successful at more senior levels in their respective branch or FA. ILE consists of a common core phase of operational instruction offered to all officers and tailored education phase (qualification course) tied to the technical requirements of the officer's branch or FA.”¹¹¹

SF Officers serving as instructors at CGSC identified a deficiency in the SF Officers Body of Knowledge when it came to preparing them for their future assignments as field grade officers in and out of the SOF community. A similar effort occurred earlier at the Navy's Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) in Monterey California in 1992 when a group of 13 SEALs attending NPS's graduate program identified a need in the curriculum to focus on the unconventional problems encountered by SOF Officers assigned to USSOCOM.¹¹² The program at the Naval Post Graduate School received formal recognition moreover, sponsorship from USSOCOM. Both programs evolved over time but serve as a cornerstone for the body of knowledge for field grade officers. These institutions provided the university platform to capture the experiences and incorporate them into education, expanding the SF Officer's Body of Knowledge. These institutions also served as important socialization venues for students, faculty, and SOF senior leadership. “Professional development is the product of a learning continuum that comprises training, experience,

¹¹⁰ Kiras, *Special Operations and Strategy*.6

¹¹¹ U.S. Army, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 8

¹¹² Colonel Brain Greenshields and Peter Gustaitis, “Naval Postgraduate School: Training special operations personnel for certainty; education for uncertainty,” *Special Warfare Magazine* 21, no5 (Sep-Oct 2008): 26-27

education, and self-improvement. PME provides the education needed to complement training, experience, and self-improvement to produce the most professionally competent individual possible.”¹¹³

If one searches for that one SOF unique education requirement based on a single curriculum or class, it becomes easy to miss the essence of the role that education plays in a SOF profession of arms. Education is a component of the body of knowledge. General Schoomaker, former Commander of USASOC, USSOCOM, and Chief of Staff of the Army talked of “train for certainty and educate for uncertainty”¹¹⁴, and it is the combination and application of education and experience that allow the SF Officer to operate successfully in today’s ambiguous and uncertain environment.

The three main pillars of a profession exist within the SF Officers community. The problem is that the Body of Knowledge and Socialization pillars begin to fade after the SFODQC. The effort to maintain the SOF profession of arms for SF Officers exists at an informal grass roots level. The SOF unique educational requirement for SF Officers attending ILE is to develop and foster the SOF profession of arms in conjunction with the service and joint profession of arms.

There are SOF unique professional requirements for SF Officers attending ILE. Those requirements are to foster the three main pillars of the SOF profession of arms in order to prepare the SF Officers for the remainder of his career in the military. The pillars of Body of Knowledge, Socialization/Corporateness, and Service to a Greater Good are the foundation on which a grass roots informal SOF profession is based. This is not that much different from how the profession of arms began early in the nation’s history. First was the establishment of the Body of Knowledge and the creation of the USMA equivalent for the SF Officer, that University was USAJFKSWCS. Next came the acceptance by the nation that the army existed in service to a great good much like GNA directed the creation of USSOCOM in order to create a SOF capability for the nation. Finally, similar to the near collapse of the army in the War of 1812, Desert One which created a new environment of corporateness and socialization

¹¹³ CJCS, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) CJCSI 1800.01C, A-1

¹¹⁴ Greenshields, “Naval Postgraduate School: Training special operations personnel for certainty; education for uncertainty,” 26

within the professions. After each of these historical disasters, the respective officers developed a sense of corporateness and professional spirit that had been lacking because of the perception that their role in the army or SOF was temporary.

It is essential to recognize the need to foster and develop the SOF profession of arms for SF Officers. By focusing on the SOF profession of arms versus a single element of a pillar, like education, ILE creates an educational environment that is flexible and adaptive. It also prevents the temptation of looking for that single solution which does not exist for the complex environment in which SF Officers operate.

Conclusion

“For many officers the knowledge they gain at ILE may be their last formal education and will have to serve them for the rest of their careers. ILE is designed as preparatory learning for field grade officers’ career with the potential for command and staff positions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The knowledge received at ILE may also be the first point in many officers’ career where they are taught how to think critically, and not what to think. Finally, ILE comes at a point in time where an officer has substantial background experiences from which to draw upon to build critical thought to assist in future problem solving.”¹¹⁵

Colonel Hollis captures the import role ILE plays in the professional development of a field grade officer, which is not solely an army phenomenon. The PME system is the cornerstone of an officer’s professional development and a critical component to the profession of arms. It is equally as important to remember that education is a component of the body of knowledge and to rely totally on education without incorporating experiences, training, and professional writings will detract from the role that the university plays in a profession. Should there be SOF unique professional military education requirements for SF Officers attending Intermediate Level PME? If so what should those requirements be?

The conclusion drawn from the research was that there are SOF unique requirements for SF Officers attending ILE at CGSC. The research rapidly indicates that focusing solely on educational

¹¹⁵ COL Thomas S. Hollis, *ILE a Casualty of War*. (masters Monograph, Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies, 2008),50

requirements would limit the professional development of the SF Officer. The flaw identified during research was the limitation of competency modeling/mapping, which is what will occur if the project fixated on education alone. The problem with the competency modeling/mapping approach is that it is a single looped systems approach, derived from Taylorism and Fordism, which is neither adaptive nor flexible which is critical to ensure SOF profession of arms remains relevant. Competence modeling/mapping relies on a false premise that one possesses the ability to identify an adequate list, not even a complete list, of competencies applicable to a rapidly changing operational environment.¹¹⁶ This checklist approach tweaks the model as required but rarely does it change the base line competencies. Competency modeling/mapping is not responsive to changes and is antithetical to critical thinking. The research made evident the need to look beyond PME and focus on the profession of arms.

There are three essential pillars required in order for recognition as a profession. A profession must have a Body of Knowledge, a Corporate Nature/Socialization Process, and Serve a Greater Social Good. The profession of arms is a true profession, as it possesses the three main pillars identified in this paper. These pillars evolved throughout the nation's early history coming together around 1820. By looking at the evolution of the profession of arms in the nation's early history, it becomes clear that the profession of arms was not static but rather very dynamic. The main pillars of the profession did not change but rather evolved over time to help the profession. The most recent evolution of the profession of arms was the creation of a 'Joint profession of Arms' with the implementation of the GNA of 1986. The creation of a joint profession of arms relied on officers to be experts in their respective services. Although not a stated intent of the GNA, a joint profession of arms evolved from the JOD and JOM, this in essence caused a joint profession of arms to form. That was not the only profession that developed from the GNA, with the creation of USSOCOM the seeds of a SOF profession of arms were planted. The main pillars critical to professions identified in this paper are present in a SOF profession of arms. The

¹¹⁶ Reed, Bullis, Collins, and Paparone, "Mapping the Route of Leadership Education: Caution Ahead", 46-53

unique requirement for SF Officers attending ILE at the CGSC is that they are part of a SOF profession of arms and as such, the opportunity to develop that profession during ILE is a critical component to the SF Officer's professional development. This may be the last formal education that the SF Officer receives and to miss the opportunity to develop and foster the SOF profession of arms would be a disservice to the nation.

Many of the pillars exist; utilizing ILE at CGSC to foster the SOF profession of arms would improve the professional development of the SF Officer.¹¹⁷ This requires the acknowledgment of the existence of a SOF profession of arms and the need to develop it. If CGSC focuses, in conjunction with USASOC, on the strengthening the three main pillars of the SOF profession of arms it will keep them vibrant and adaptive so that the SF Officer is prepared for the ever changing environment. The SOF unique requirement for SF Officers attending ILE is to foster the SOF profession of arms.

¹¹⁷ The SOF Ed Element created the SOF Studies program in CGSC's ILE. This program expands the SOF Officers body of knowledge through a program of instruction that focuses on SOF studies. Over the years, the SOF Studies program has moved throughout the ILE curriculum, currently residing in the elective portion of the course. SOF Ed faculty members, senior leaders and subject matter experts are brought share their experiences as part of the student's education process. The SOF Officers are required to publish a SOF Essay, some of which are published in CGSC's SOF Essay book. All throughout the SOF Studies program the student go through a Socialization process by interacting with the faculty, fellow students, and guest lecturers. In the end the Officer volunteers to for the SOF studies program, there is no mandatory requirement that the SF Officer enroll. When he enrolls, he adds additional requirements to his education sacrificing for the greater good of the SOF Community.

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